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The Seductive Power of
Patriarchal Stories
AVIVA ORENSTEIN*
In his book, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom,1 the late Pro-
fessor Andrew Taslitz (hereinafter lovingly referred to as Taz) ana-
lyzed the patriarchal stories that permit lawyers, judges, and juries to
rely on sexist stereotypes and rape myths to discount victims’ accounts
of rape.2 To honor Taz’s scholarship, this Essay applies his brilliant
scholarship and compassionate insights to recent case law involving
rape shield and the interpretation of rape shield statutes.
This Essay will focus on cases in which the accused argues that
rape shield’s policy of excluding certain evidence about the rape vic-
tim violates his constitutional rights, and it will question the exception
for prior sex with the accused. It examines the degree to which judges
rely on patriarchal stories to determine whether evidence about the
victim’s sexual past or propensities is essential to a fair defense. It also
analyzes the extent to which such constitutional objections function as
a vehicle for circumventing the social policy and law reform for which
rape shield was promulgated.
This Essay will begin by reviewing Taz’s thesis about the role of
patriarchal stories in shaping rape trials and the impediments such sto-
ries present for victims trying to tell their stories in a way that judges,
* Professor of Law and Val Nolan Fellow, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The
author wishes to thank her mother, Sylvia Orenstein, a retired appellate public defender, for her
extraordinary help in editing this piece.
1. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM (1999).  The name
of this Essay, The Seductive Power of Patriarchal Stories, is intended as a tribute to the power of
Taz’s scholarship, which explained the nature of patriarchal stories and their role in shaping the
culture of rape trials.  Additionally, it acknowledges the continuing, powerful draw of such sto-
ries on our collective imaginations, and discusses how these stories influence our understanding
and treatment of rape victims fifteen years after Taz’s masterwork was published.
2. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387 (1996) (basing the book in part on his
article).
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juries, and the public can understand. It then briefly presents the fed-
eral rape shield statute. It analyzes the operation of recent constitu-
tional attacks on rape shield in recent rape cases, focusing on an en
banc decision from the Sixth Circuit.3 The critique of the recent con-
stitutional cases will lead to a broader analysis of the role of propen-
sity and a deeper examination of what information about the victim
the jury needs to know. Finally, this Essay will discuss the role of pro-
pensity in rape shield exceptions.
A review of recent cases validates the persistent power of patriar-
chal stories. The open-ended constitutional exception invites sexist
thinking and subversion of rape shield principles. Sometimes, the ac-
cused’s constitutional claims indicate a resistance to the entire enter-
prise of rape shield—the accused is merely attempting to trigger the
exception to legitimate the patriarchal stories he sees as essential to
his defense.4 In other cases, truly difficult questions arise about the
fairness of excluding evidence that negates a presumption about the
victim or conveys significant information about the victim’s motive.
I. PATRIARCHAL STORIES AND THE CULTURE
OF RAPE TRIALS
Taz observed how cultural tropes, the adversary system, and the
language of courtroom discourse serve to subvert the victim’s ability
to tell her story and be heard. He noted how gender stereotypes and
rape myths can play into sexist and racist attitudes that harm the vic-
tim and render her less likely to be believed. Rape myths are empiri-
cally untrue but firmly held notions about the incidence and nature of
rape.5 These prejudicial false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and
rape perpetrators rely on and perpetuate gender stereotypes. As Taz
explained, “jurors judge the credibility of courtroom stories by com-
paring how they square with standard cultural ones.”6
Taz recounted the various and sometimes contradictory cultural
tale of rape. He observed our culture’s “dual message: only vixens get
raped, and when it happens it really is not rape anyway because they
3. See infra Part II D.
4. As did Taz, I refer to the accused rapists as men and the alleged victims as women
because this reflects the overwhelming gender dynamics of rape accusations outside of prison.
See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at xi.
5. See generally Eliana Suarez & Tahany M. Gadalia, Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-
Analysis on Rape Myths, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2010 (2010) (examining rape-myths
acceptance in published studies).
6. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 17.
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really want and deserve it.”7 Such patriarchal stories “portray women
as hypersexual, selfish liars.”8 This focus on the lying victim is pro-
nounced in rape cases, and is associated with either female delusion or
vengeance.9 As Taz observed, “[r]arely is the robbery victim portrayed
as deranged or a liar.”10 He therefore concluded that “[t]reating rape
like other crimes fails to contend with the unique power of these
narratives.”11
The patriarchal story concerning a “real” rape victim12 recounts
the tale of a virtuous woman who behaves modestly and cautiously
but nevertheless is brutally attacked by a deviant stranger. When the
facts of a rape story diverge from this cultural paradigm—such as
when the victim is perceived to be sexually promiscuous, incautious,
or drunk, she is seen as untrustworthy, partly culpable, or simply not
worth bothering about.13
II. FEDERAL RAPE SHIELD LAW
Historically, the law treated a woman claiming to be a rape victim
with great suspicion,14 subjecting her to intense cross-examination re-
garding her dress, sexual history, and proclivities. Any prior sexual
activity on her part outside of marriage undermined the veracity of
the victim’s claim. First, defense attorneys argued, such sexual activity
indicated that she did not value her chastity or her marriage vows, a
7. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 8.
8. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 8.
9. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 18.
10. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 6.
11. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 154.
12. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 1 (1987).
13. Psychologists tell us that victims are blamed for sexual or incautious behavior such as
flirting, taking a man to her room, or drinking. See, e.g., Dominic Abrams et al., Perceptions of
Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: The Role of Benevolent and Hostile Sexism in Victim Blame
and Rape Proclivity, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111 (2003) (“Researchers have re-
ported that both legal practitioners and laypersons attribute blame to rape victims on the basis of
extralegal factors such as clothing.”) (citations omitted); Amy Grubb & Julie Harrower, Attribu-
tion of Blame in Cases of Rape: An Analysis of Participant Gender, Type of Rape and Perceived
Similarity to the Victim, 13 AGGRESSION AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 396, 397 (2008).
14. This suspicion can be traced back to the Bible, in which rape accusations that occurred
in the city, where screams could be heard, were disbelieved. See Deuteronomy 22:24–25. As Taz
explained:
[F]ear of female lies led judges to caution jurors about Hale’s concerns. Again, for no
other crime were jurors told to distrust the victim. ‘Hell hath no fury like a woman
scorned,’ the ‘sense of shame after consenting to illicit intercourse’, and similar motives
to lie were said to explain why rape had to be treated differently. Notably, to avoid
false cries of rape by women feeling guilty about their consensual sexual exploits, the
law required women to resist to the utmost.
TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 152.
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fact which made her a promiscuous character who was more likely to
consent to sex with the accused. Second, any pre-marital sexual activ-
ity was deemed a character flaw that generally undermined her truth-
fulness.15 Third, although it was never openly expressed as such, a
woman who was sexually active outside of marriage was already
“damaged goods”; her dignity and personal integrity were thereby
deemed less valuable, and as a realistic matter, would not be vindi-
cated in court.16
In response to the humiliating treatment of rape victims at trial
and concerns that such victims were being discouraged from testifying,
a nationwide movement arose in the 1970s and 1980s to amend both
the substantive and procedural law concerning rape.17 Although the
statutes vary considerably, rape shield is designed to restrict informa-
tion about the victim’s sexual history, behavior, and preferences in
order to limit irrelevant inquiries that may embarrass or harass the
victim.18 According to the Supreme Court, rape shield law “represents
a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy.”19
Jurisdictions employ various approaches to the construction and
reach of rape shield statutes.20 One approach, exemplified by Federal
15. See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 152 (“The victim’s prior sexual conduct was relevant, both
to impeach her credibility (tramps lie) and to make her consent more likely.”); Heather D.
Flowe et al., Rape Shield Laws and Sexual Behavior Evidence: Effects of Consent Level and
Women’s Sexual History on Rape Allegations, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 160 (2007)
(“[E]vidence of promiscuity was routinely admitted at trial to undermine the credibility of a
complainant and to demonstrate to the jury that in all likelihood she consented on the occasion
in question.”) (citations omitted).
16. As Taz noted:
Rape trial practices also reinforce oppressive social norms. Among the gendered norms
are that a woman should not go out at night without a male protector, should dress
modestly in public, and should not openly express sexual interest in a man. Women are
taught that violating these norms risks rape. Correspondingly, to violate these norms
risks being labeled a “slut”, for whom any assault is nonrape. When the rape victim is
treated as a slut at trial and her assailant is found not guilty, the citizenry publicly
expresses approval of these norms. Yet, these norms limit women’s freedom of move-
ment and expression. They contribute to a gendered caste system.
TASLITZ, supra note 1 at 113.
17. See generally Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the
Next Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 469–70 (2005) (discussing
the first wave of rape reform 1970–2000).
18. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Con-
sent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 80–81 (2002) (dividing rape shield
statutes into four categories, distinguished by the manner and degree to which they admit evi-
dence of a womans sexual history).
19. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1991).
20. See Helim Kathleen Chun & Lindsey Love, Rape Sexual Assault and Evidentiary Mat-
ters, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 591–93 (2013) (distinguishing legislative, federal, judicial
414 [VOL. 58:411
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Rule of Evidence 412, is a blanket ban on propensity evidence con-
cerning the victim, only allowing for limited exceptions. Rule 412 pro-
vides exceptions for: (A) evidence of other sources of the cause of the
victim’s injury; (B) evidence of a prior relationship between the victim
and the accused, where defense is consent; and (C) cases when “exclu-
sion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”21 The last,
broad and amorphous exception contrasts markedly with the much
more specific and narrow exceptions in the same rule.
Rule 412 serves as a template for many states.22 Some jurisdic-
tions that follow the Rule 412 approach to rape shield provide addi-
tional exceptions, excluding evidence that:
• demonstrates prior untruthful rape allegations,23
• impeaches the victim where she made her prior sexual behavior
an issue,24
• illustrates a distinctive pattern of sexual behavior that closely re-
sembles the crime charged25 and, remarkably,
• provides the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion
that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts
charged.26
Other jurisdictions do not follow the federal approach and in-
stead employ some sort of balancing test, weighing the probative
value of the evidence against its unfair prejudice to the victim.27 All
versions provide for the possibility of having a nonpublic hearing
outside the hearing of the jury to protect the victim’s privacy and
shield her from humiliation when issues of her prior sexual behavior
or propensities are first raised.
Whatever the organization, rape shield gives the trial judge dis-
cretion. As Taz observed, historically “police, prosecutors, judges, and
hybrid and evidentiary purpose approaches); see also Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 773
(1986) (documenting four distinct approaches). See generally NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
ASSOCIATION, Rape Shield Statutes (2011).
21. FED. R. EVID. 412(b).
22. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7(A)(1)–(3) (West 2010); UTAH R. EVID. 412(b).
23. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.11(2)(b)(3) (West 2012).
24. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-11(B) (West 2014).
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(3) (West 2014); TENN. R. EVID. 412(c)(4)(iii).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 412 (b)(4) (West 2014).
27. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.020(3)(d) (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312(a)(iv) (2010); TEX. R. EVID.
412(b)(3).
2015] 415
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defense counsel have used their discretion to circumvent these
reforms.”28
III. WHEN DOES THE ACCUSED’S DESIRE TO
INTRODUCE EVIDENCE BARRED BY RAPE SHIELD RISE
TO A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
A. Potential Constitutional Rights Involved
When criminal defendants raise a constitutional objection to the
exclusion of evidence because of rape shield, they cite the Sixth-
Amendment right to meaningfully confront witnesses and the right to
present a complete defense: “Whether rooted directly in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Pro-
cess or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportu-
nity to present a complete defense.’”29 “Highly relevant” or “indis-
pensable” evidence may be constitutionally mandated, even if it runs
afoul of established evidence rules.30
The right to present a complete defense, however, is not unlim-
ited. As the Supreme Court explained in Michigan v. Lucas,31 that
right  “‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legiti-
mate interests in the criminal trial process.’”32 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court has found that some evidence, even if it is prohibited by
rape shield, must be admitted for the trial to be fair. In Olden v. Ken-
tucky, the Court held that an accused was permitted to introduce evi-
dence that the white rape victim was living with a black man with
whom she was having an extramarital affair.33 The defense in the case
was consent and the accused wished to show the victim had a motive
28. Taslitz, supra note 1, at 7.
29. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (quotations omitted).
30. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 683 (1986) (holding that the accused had a right to
present the conditions under which his confession was made); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 302 (1973) (holding that hearsay statements regarding a confession to the crime by someone
other than the accused and the inability of the accused to confront that person violated Cham-
bers’ due-process right to present a defense).
31. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991). See generally United States v. Elbert, 561
F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lucas).
32. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987)); see Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (noting that the trial court has “wide latitude” to impose “rea-
sonable limits” to avoid “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”).
33. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988).
416 [VOL. 58:411
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to lie about having been raped because her lover saw her disembark
from the accused’s car.34
B. Procedural Posture of Federal Cases
Constitutional questions regarding rape shield exclusion of evi-
dence arise in federal court in two ways. First, the accused can directly
challenge the exclusion of the victim’s sexual reputation, history, or
proclivity at trial or on appeal. In such direct appeals, the accused
argues that the final exception of Rule 412 has been triggered and that
certain evidence is so essential to a fair trial that the “exclusion would
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”35 Because rape is gener-
ally not a federal offense, there are not many such cases in the federal
system outside the military and Indian Country, where federal courts
have jurisdiction over the crime of rape.36
Alternatively, such cases arise in habeas corpus collateral attacks
on state convictions. The standard of review is highly deferential. On
habeas, a federal court will reverse a state’s determination only if it
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts.”37
C. An Overview of Recent Rape Shield Cases with
Constitutional Challenges
Many of the so-called constitutional objections to exclusion of ev-
idence about the victim are nothing more than resistance to the regu-
lar function and underlying policy of rape shield.38 For instance, in
U.S. v. Ambroise, the court rejected the appellant’s argument that he
was denied his constitutional right to present a defense and to cross-
34. Id. at 230.
35. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C).
36. See generally, Aviva Orenstein, Propensity or Stereotype?: A Bad Evidence Experiment
in Indian Country, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173 (2010) (noting the jurisdictional anoma-
lies of federal rape cases).
37. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2015).
38. See also United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that evi-
dence that the victim propositioned an investigating deputy soon after the incident was rightfully
excluded under rape shield); Collins v. State, 223 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) (hold-
ing that trial court rightfully excluded victim’s history of prostitution despite accused’s argument
“that this ruling impaired his ability to impeach [the victim] with her past crimes of ‘moral turpi-
tude’ . . . because the convictions and past acts of prostitution were relevant to prove [the vic-
tim’s] motive or propensity to lie and to supported Collins’ defense of consent”).
2015] 417
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examine witnesses, because evidence of the victim’s consensual sexual
intercourse with one of the appellant’s co-conspirators would have
made it “more likely that she had consensual sex with the
appellant.”39
Cases that involve a serious constitutional challenge to rape
shield’s exclusion of evidence seem to fall into five distinct categories:
(1) the victim’s past sexual conduct is offered to explain a child-vic-
tim’s knowledge about sex;40 (2) the victim’s prior sexual activity re-
flects on the victim’s motive to lie (for instance, the victim might lie
about consent to placate a jealous husband or boyfriend,41 to protect a
married paramour,42 to avoid her parents’ wrath if they discover she
willingly participated in premarital sex,43 or to prevent the accused
from exposing something private about her sex life);44 (3) the victim’s
prior history of prostitution or exotic dancing is offered to show con-
sent to the sex act;45 (4) the victim’s prior, allegedly false rape reports
39. United States v. Ambroise, No. NMCM 9900167, 2001 WL 1488485, at *6 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 16, 2001).
40. See generally United States v. Seibel, 712 F.3d 1229, 1234–35 (8th Cir. 2013); Merritt v.
Roper, No. 4:09CV01068 AGF, 2012 WL 3541901, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2012); State v. Mack,
No. 100695, 2014 WL 5500021, (Ohio Oct. 30, 2014).
41. See United States v. Sizemore, ARMY 20051235, 2008 WL 8087965, at *6 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Apr. 29, 2008).
42. See United States v. Pumpkin Seed, 572 F.3d 552, 561–62 (8th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the
theory that victim lied about rape to protect her married lover because she was unable to be-
come pregnant and her contracting a sexually transmitted disease would not have exposed the
fact that she was in a relationship).
43. See United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 256–57 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (discussing the extent
to which the accused had a constitutional right to present evidence that the victim had a motive
to fabricate the rape allegation to hide the victim’s other sexual activity from her mother).
44. See Martin v. McKee, No. 2:11-CV-15034, 2013 WL 3224174, at *18 (E.D. Mich. June
25, 2013) (crediting “[p]etitioner’s theory of defense . . . that the complainant had a motive to
falsely accuse him of rape because she was trying to protect her adult-aged boyfriend from going
to jail for having sex with a minor,” but finding that the issue was improperly raised on habeas).
Compare Cecil v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 12, 17 (Ky. 2009) (rejecting accused’s argument
that evidence of victim’s sexual behavior and prostitution while a runaway was relevant to her
motive for inventing a rape claim against him because she feared discovery of her activity by her
family, possible pregnancy, or a sexually transmitted disease), with State v. Stephen F., 188 P.3d
84, 90–91 (N.M 2008) (trial court infringed on juvenile’s Sixth-Amendment right to effective
cross examination by forbidding accused to establish a motive to fabricate by questioning the
victim about a prior sexual encounter, and the consequent punishment she received from her
parents). In yet another variation, an accused wanted to claim that the allegedly false rape accu-
sation was made because the accused had threatened to reveal that the victim had undergone an
abortion. Valentine v. United States, No. 3:11-CV-361-S, 2014 WL 2766076, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
28, 2014).
45. See United States v. Mack, No. 1:13CR278, 2014 WL 356502, at *3 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 31,
2014). The fact of prostitution becomes more convincing if the accused uses it to explain that the
conflict arose because of accused’s failure to pay for a consensual sexual transaction. See Chun &
Love, supra note 20, at 587.
418 [VOL. 58:411
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are used to impeach the victim’s credibility;46 and (5) the victim’s
prior sexual practices, which are deemed unusual and unlikely to have
been consented to, such as a propensity for rough or sadomasochistic
sex,47 use of sex toys or other objects,48 interracial sex, or sex with
multiple partners49 are offered to negate the assumption that the vic-
tim was unlikely to have consented. It is this last category that is ex-
plored in Gagne v. Booker, below.
D. Gagne v. Booker – A Recent Case Considering the
Constitutionality of Excluding Evidence under Rape
Shield
Gagne v. Booker,50 which was heard en banc by the Sixth Circuit
in 2012, presents a fascinating case study of the tension between rape
shield protections and concerns for the accused’s right to present a full
defense. It is particularly interesting because the accused’s concerns
about deprivation of vital evidence rely squarely on rape myths and
assumptions about women’s sexuality.
The underlying facts of Gagne involved what all parties acknowl-
edged began as consensual sex between the accused, Gagne, and his
46. See United States v. Crow Eagle, 705 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2013); Mathis v. Berghuis,
90 F. App’x 101, 107 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s admission of prior false rape
claim); Burke v. Pallito, No. 2:12 CV 197, 2013 WL 6145810, at *11 (D. Vt. Nov. 20 2013). Often,
courts that reject the proffered testimony do so because they find that the accused has failed to
show that the prior claim was false. See Crow Eagle, 705 F.3d at 329 (8th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
impeachment of victim with allegedly false prior rape charges where accused offered no evi-
dence that the prior charges were false); Bouie v. Mendoza-Powers, No. CV07-111-JVS, 2009
WL 5220726, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009) (finding that false claims “of molestation would be
admissible under California law as relevant to the victim’s credibility, but that accused was
“speculating at best that R.’s comments involved a false claim of molestation.”); United States v.
Hohenstein, No. ACM 37965, 2013 WL 3971576, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. July 1, 2013); cf.
Piscopo v. Michigan, 479 F. App’x. 698, 704 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting accused’s wish to introduce
evidence of victim’s claims that she was abused by her father, who, like the accused was a pastor,
to show that her perception was skewed in the present case). See TASLITZ, supra note 1, at
587–88.
47. See Buchanan v. Harry, No. 5:07-CV-11630, 2014 WL 1999047, at *5 (E.D. Mich., May
15, 2014); see generally, Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 131–37 (2002).
48. See United States v. Ramone, 218 F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2000) (excluding the vic-
tim’s statement that she previously used objects as part of sex with the accused, finding that
evidence was not probative of whether victim consented after brutal beating by the accused).
49. See Haidl v. Cate, No. SACV 11-133 GW (AJW), 2014 WL 102341, at *19 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 7, 2014) (rejecting the accused’s argument that evidence of the victim’s willingness to engage
in sexual act with multiple partners in front of others and that she derived pleasure from inser-
tion of inanimate objects was crucial to their consent defense even though it was arguably im-
peachment in part because victim was incapacitated and issue of whether she might have
consented if not inebriated was relevant).
50. Gagne v. Booker, 680 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Gagne II].
2015] 419
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ex-girlfriend, Clark.51 At some point, another accused, Swathwood,
joined the sexual encounter and both men engaged in oral, vaginal
and anal sex with Clark.52 The sexual activity became rough and in-
volved spanking, whipping, and insertion of various objects into
Clark’s vagina and anus, which caused her to bleed and bruise. All
parties were drinking and using drugs. After the sexual encounter,
Gagne and Swathwood took Clark’s ATM card to buy more crack
cocaine, but did not return to Clark’s home and instead smoked it by
themselves. The parties agreed to these facts but did not agree on
whether Clark consented to the inclusion of Swathwood and the sub-
sequent sexual activity among the three of them.53 Clark claimed she
had been forcibly raped. Gagne and Swathwood claimed that Clark
consented and was falsely charging rape because she was a woman
scorned (Gagne, her ex-boyfriend, was leaving for California) or be-
cause Clark was angry about not getting to partake of the drugs that
were bought with her money.54
The Michigan trial court admitted some, but not all, of the evi-
dence the defendants wanted to introduce about Clark’s prior sexual
behavior and propensities. The Michigan trial court admitted testi-
mony about a previous consensual sexual encounter between Clark
and the two defendants, Gagne and Swathwood. Clark did not fully
remember the prior incident (because of alcohol) but she did not deny
that it occurred.55 This prior incident with Gagne and Swathwood in-
cluded some other women but did not involve Clark having sex with
both men simultaneously. Additionally, Gagne was permitted to intro-
duce evidence that he and Clark had engaged in consensual sex play
51. The facts are portrayed in both Gagne II, and the prior panel opinion, Gagne v. Booker,
606 F.3d 278, 280–81 (6th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Gagne I]. Although the victim is referred to as
P.C. in the en banc opinion, see Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 496 (calling her “Gagne’s former girlfriend,
P.C.”), she is named in the panel opinion, see Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 279 (referring to her as
“Gagne’s ex-girlfriend, Pamela Clark.”). Various arguments can be made about the utility, wis-
dom, and fairness of withholding the alleged victim’s name. See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues
in Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM. L. REV.1585, 1593–97 (2007).
52. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 280.  Both Gagne and Swathwood were convicted for “forcibly and
simultaneously engaging in sexual activities with Clark.” Id. at 279.
53. See id. at 281 (The accused’s “description of the sexual activities differed only in that
Clark consented to them.”). Clark also claimed that her ATM card was taken without her per-
mission. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 497.
54. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 497. Because of a procedural failure to appeal in time to the
Michigan Court of Appeals, Swathwood lost his right to bring a habeas action. See Gagne I, 606
F.3d at 283 n.3.
55. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 282.  The consensual nature of that encounter could be questioned
given that Clark was so drunk she claimed to remember none of it, although she did not dispute
that it could have happened. See id.
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involving rough sex, including the use of a whip and the insertion of
various foreign objects into Clark’s vagina and anus.56 This evidence
fell under Michigan’s exception to rape shield, which permits
“[e]vidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.”57
The key evidentiary dispute and potential constitutional ques-
tions concerned the Michigan trial court’s exclusion of evidence of
that: (1) Clark had a three-way sexual encounter with Gagne and a
different man, Bermudez, a month before the alleged rape, when
Gagne and Clark were still dating (hereinafter “the Bermudez evi-
dence”); and, (2) Clark had offered to have sex with Gagne and his
father simultaneously. Gagne argued that the trial unfairly excluded
both pieces of evidence in violation of his constitutional rights.
The Michigan trial court excluded both pieces of evidence be-
cause it determined that their admission would have violated Michi-
gan’s rape shield law.58 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
Gagne’s conviction and the Michigan Supreme Court refused to hear
the case.59
Gagne brought a pro se habeas petition to the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted habeas re-
lief.60 The district court concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals
violated Gagne’s Sixth-Amendment right to a fair trial, to confront
the witnesses against him, and to present a complete defense by ex-
cluding the Bermudez evidence and Clark’s alleged offer to have sex
56. See Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 533 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). Clark agreed about the whip,
but denied any past sex play with a wine bottle. See id. at 522 n. 2 (Moore, J., concurring).
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS §750.520j(1)(a) (quoted in Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 281 n.2).
58. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 281.  Although there was serious disagreement about the credibility
of the two contested pieces of evidence, they were excluded because of rape shield, not because
the evidence was deemed baseless. Some of the judges expressed skepticism of the notion that
the other events occurred at all. See id. at 299 (Batchelder, J., dissenting) (portraying the allega-
tions as “self-serving and unverifiable” and noting that “Clark was prepared to refute these
accusations, had Gagne been allowed to raise them.”). Also, to the extent they did occur, at least
one judge on the en banc panel questioned the factual similarities between the Bermudez inci-
dent and the rape charged. See Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 522 (Moore, J., concurring in the judgment
only) (disputing the dissent’s characterization of the Bermudez proffer as brutal or violent and
noting that “the defense certainly did not proffer that the Bermudez incident left the victim
bleeding and with bruises all over her body”).
59. People v. Swathwood, Nos. 235540 and 235541, 2003 WL 1880143, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2003) (concluding that the evidence of the three-way sexual activity with
Bermudez and the alleged invitation to Gagne’s father were irrelevant because they involved
third parties, not Gagne’s co-defendant Swathwood, and noting that the jury heard at length
about another encounter between the victim and the two accused). The Michigan Supreme
Court denied certification, People v. Gagne, 673 N.W.2d 755 (2003) (unpublished table
decision).
60. Gagne v. Booker, No. 04–60283, 2007 WL 1975035, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2007).
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with Gagne and his father simultaneously.61 A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas.62
The panel’s majority opinion held that “[i]n our view, the court of
appeals underestimated the vital nature of the disputed material,
which we believe to be highly relevant, primarily as substantive evi-
dence on the issue of whether Clark consented to the sexual activ-
ity.”63 The majority concluded that where “the question of guilt or
innocence turned almost entirely on the credibility of the victim’s tes-
timony regarding consent, the exclusion was an unreasonable applica-
tion of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court.’”64
A fractured en banc Court reversed the grant of habeas. In eight
separate opinions the judges disagreed on:
• the source and specificity of the constitutional protections
involved,65
• whether, even if a constitutional problem might exist with the
exclusion of the evidence, the habeas standard was met,66
• whether the excluded evidence fell within the rape shield excep-
tion relating to the victim’s prior sexual relationship with the
accused,67
61. Id. at *5–9. See Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 497.
62. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 279. Judge Norris wrote the panel opinion, in which Judge
Kethledge concurred and to which Judge Batchelder dissented. See generally id.
63. Id. at 286.
64. Id. at 288–89.
65. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 493. The judges disagreed about the reach of Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683 (1986) (holding that due process required the admission of the circumstances sur-
rounding a sixteen-year-old’s confession to murder, even though the court had found the confes-
sion voluntary) and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that the hearsay rule
could not serve to bar a crucial confession by another person to the murder with which Cham-
bers was charged, and that Chambers had a constitutional right to confront the party who alleg-
edly made and repeated the confession). The dissent read both cases broadly to require
admission of highly relevant, non-cumulative, and indispensable evidence, where credibility was
central to the dispute. The dissenters also read Chambers to stand for the principle that eviden-
tiary rules must give way to basic fairness. The plurality read both cases more narrowly, confin-
ing them to their facts. The plurality also noted that in Crane there was no strong governmental
policy favoring exclusion of the evidence as there was with rape shield. Gagne II at 493, 523.
66. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 521–27. Some of those concurring in the judgment to reverse the
grant of habeas relied on this very high standard, finding that even if constitutionally debatable,
Michigan’s decision to exclude the evidence could not be said to violate a clear determination of
constitutional law as established by the United State Supreme Court. See, e.g., id. at 521–22
(Moore, J., concurring) (“Gagne is not entitled to habeas relief because the Michigan Court of
Appeals did not unreasonably apply the clearly established constitutional principles.”); id. at
526–27 (“Although I find the dissent’s interpretation of the record reasonable, I do not think it is
compelled.”).
67. Id. at 519, 524–28.  For the dissent, the two pieces of excluded evidence clearly fell
squarely within the exception to rape shield involving prior sex with accused. See id. at 528
(Kethledge, J., dissenting). For the plurality, the importance of the excluded evidence and the
prejudice that its exclusion engendered was not that Clark had sex with Gagne before — there
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• the extent to which the court had discretion to exclude sexual
behavior even if it fell within that exception,68
• the extent to which Clark’s other sexual behavior admitted at
trial (her prior threesome with Swathwood and Gagne, and her
prior sexual activity with Gagne) mitigated the harm of exclud-
ing the allegations about Bermudez and Gagne’s father, and
finally,69
• whether, even if Michigan’s rape shield law were properly ap-
plied, the basic fairness of the trial was jeopardized by the exclu-
sion of the evidence.
On this last point, the en banc debate revealed the persistent
draw of patriarchal stories. Essentially, the dissenters believed that
past sexual behavior was so probative of consent on this occasion that
to exclude it violated Gagne’s constitutional rights. Writing for the
dissenters, Judge Kethledge, who concurred in the original panel opin-
ion, believed that “evidence that the complainant had consented to
the same kind of conduct with the defendant, only a handful of weeks
before, is indispensable to his defense.”70 Admission was not only
constitutionally necessary but required “by any measure of fairness
and common sense.”71Judge Kethledge continued: “The only evidence
with which Gagne could realistically defend himself—evidence, I
might add, that suggests a substantial possibility that he is innocent—
was the evidence that the trial court excluded. . . . What was left was
an empty husk of a trial—at whose conclusion came a prison sentence
of up to 45 years.”72
According to the dissenters, a jury could not possibly imagine
that a woman would consent to the group sex, rough sex, or insertion
of foreign objects into her orifices that Clark experienced in the al-
was much admitted evidence as to that point — but that a third-party was involved. As Judge
Clay explained: “It is clear that the purpose of the Bermudez evidence would not have been to
demonstrate prior consent between Clark and Gagne, but prior consent between Clark and
Bermudez. What is not clear is how evidence of consensual sex between Clark and Bermudez
would be material to the material factual issue of whether Clark consented to sex with Gagne on
[the date in question].” Id. at 524 (Clay, J., concurring); id. at 519 (Griffin, J., concurring) (“Con-
trary to the dissent’s conclusion, evidence regarding consensual group sex does not fit into an
exception to Michigan’s Rape Shield Statute.”).
68. Id. at 524 (Clay, J., concurring).
69. According to the dissenters, the admitted evidence concerning a prior sexual encounter
among Clark, Gagne, and Swathwood was insufficient to make this point with the jury because
the events concerning the prior sex act that were admitted were distinct, particularly because
Clark did not engaged in sex with both men simultaneously. Id. at 532.
70. Id. at 527 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 534 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
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leged rape. Although the jury did hear evidence about such prior be-
havior, the excluded evidence was vital to counteract the jurors’
notion that consent would have been unlikely under the circum-
stances.73 Therefore, the jury simply had to hear the excluded evi-
dence, which indicated that Clark had engaged in such behavior
before.74
The dissent in the en banc opinion rests on the sexist notion that
unless forced, respectable women (“good girls”) do not engage in the
deviant sexual behavior described in this case. The dissenters feared
that exclusion of evidence about Clark’s past sexual behavior would
leave the jury with the misimpression that Clark was a “normal” wo-
man with normal appetites, and therefore could not possibly have con-
sented to the sexual encounter at issue.75 Judge Griffin criticized this
approach in his concurrence, noting that “the logic espoused by the
dissent opens the door to prior sexual conduct of the victim being ad-
missible, as a constitutional requirement, whenever the sexual conduct
at issue is outside the norm.”76
Another indication of the dissenters’ adoption of patriarchal sto-
ries concerns the frequent mention of the victim’s consumption of
drugs and alcohol—though it had no relevance to the question of con-
sent or the contested evidentiary issues. In fact, the dissenters seem
positively hostile to the victim because of her drinking, drug use, and
past sexual behavior. In his concurring panel opinion, Judge
Kethledge noted that Clark engaged “in consensual oral sex with
Gagne minutes before the very incident for which he was convicted
(and moreover that she had drunk a pint of vodka and nine or so
73. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 282. According to Judge Norris, the prosecutor remarked upon the
unlikeliness of the defendants’ version of the story. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated
that the event was “more consistent with a pornographic movie than real life.” Id.
74. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 532 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). As Judge Norris stated in the
panel’s majority decision: “The idea that someone could have consented to this sort of thing
seems incredible absent proof that the person had consented to it before.” Gagne I, 606 F.3d at
288. Similarly, the district court stated: “[e]vidence of prior group sex involving Petitioner and
Bermudez and evidence of the complainant’s invitation to Petitioner’s father was an indication
that it was not unusual or implausible for the complainant to engage in a ‘threesome.’” Gagne
Booker, No. 04-60283, 2007 WL 1975035, at *8 (E.D. Mich. July 2, 2007) (cited in Gagne II, 680
F.3d. at 525) (Clay, J., concurring).
75. As a doctrinal matter, for Judges Norris and Kethledge on the panel, the case presented
an easy application of Michigan’s exception for prior sexual activity with the actor because
Gagne was involved in both and according to the dissenters “these prior incidents have signifi-
cant relevance not only because Gagne and Clark were involved in them, but also because they
are both remarkably similar to the events that occurred the night [in question].” Gagne I, 606
F.3d at 286.
76. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 520 (Griffin, J., concurring).
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beers and smoked crack in the hours before the incident).”77 This par-
enthetical aside is not only irrelevant, but also breezily disdainful in
tone.
In a chilling, if revealing statement, Judge Kethledge wrote: “In
this trial, I respectfully submit, there was virtually nothing left for the
rape shield statute to protect.”78 Judge Kethledge means that Clark’s
interests in privacy and in preventing potential shame and embarrass-
ment “such as they were in this case, given the evidence of sexual
activity (albeit non-brutal) and drug use that was admitted at trial”
were already forfeited.79 Judge Kethledge expressed doubt that admit-
ting the Bermudez evidence80 and the alleged offer regarding Gagne’s
father “would have diminished those interests any further.”81 Appar-
ently, according to the dissenters, there are behaviors that put a victim
beyond the core policies and protections of rape shield.82
In arguing that a trial without the excluded evidence was so un-
fair as to be unconstitutional, the dissenters insinuated that somehow
concern for rape shield (and sexual politics or perhaps political cor-
rectness) had trumped basic fairness.83 Judge Kethledge criticized the
notion “that certain statutory values are so important as to trump con-
stitutional ones. . . . There is no rape-defendant exception to the
Constitution.”84
The implication from and effect of the opinions of the dissenters
en banc (as well as from the district court and the two judges on the
panel who voted to grant habeas) is that rape shield exists to protect
77. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 292 (Kethledge, J., concurring).
78. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 535 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). Part of the reason for this astound-
ing statement lies in Judge Kethledge’s belief that the facts of this case fall squarely within the
exception for sex with the accused; see also Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 292 (Kethledge, J., concurring)
(“I submit that, under the circumstances of this trial, there was virtually nothing left of those
interests to protect.”); see generally Olden v. Kentucky,  488 U.S. 227 (1988)
79. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 535 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 534–35.
81. Id. at 535.
82. See generally id. at 535. The admitted evidence stripped Clark of any rape shield protec-
tion. Ironically, however, this other evidence was, according to the dissent, insufficient to render
harmless any error in excluding the Bermudez and father allegations, but was not sufficient to
educate the jury about the proclivities of the accused. See generally id.
83. Cf. Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 376 (2008) (“[W]e are puzzled by the dissent’s
decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse cases. Is the suggestion that we should have
one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and Crawford described) for all other
crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are frequently di-
rected against women?”).
84. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 528 (Kethledge, J., dissenting). Similarly, Judge Martin, who con-
curred in dissent, expressed his “disappoint[ment] in the majority’s decision to frame this eviden-
tiary issue as a protection of Michigan’s rape shield statute.” Id. at 527 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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the temperate, tee-totaling, sexually tame, decorous, missionary-posi-
tion type of victim. Clark was portrayed as none of these and hence
undeserving of (and indeed beyond) protection. Besides, according to
the dissenters, given the evidence that had already been admitted,
Clark had no reputational or privacy interest to salvage anyway. On
the other hand (and here there is a slight tension given the first point),
the dissenters believed that the accused will suffer because the jury
may not realize how abnormal the victim is: the evidence of her past
behavior was vital to show a pattern of abnormal sexual appetites and
promiscuity that make the accused’s consent defense plausible.
IV. THE DRAW OF PATRIARCHAL STORIES
A. Critiquing the Dissent in Gagne
By arguing that Clark’s past sexual behavior was not only rele-
vant, but constitutionally mandated by clear Supreme Court prece-
dent, the dissenters reveal a deep and abiding belief in the truth of
patriarchal stories. The dissenters say that they accept rape shield
law;85 and they more or less seem to credit the instrumental aspects of
rape shield—encouraging victims to report and testify.86 They are will-
ing to prohibit inquiry into a victim’s sexual history where such evi-
dence is merely meant to harass and is not “indispensable.”87 They are
all too eager, however, to adopt the retrograde view that the victim’s
past sexual practices and proclivities indicate a great likelihood of fu-
ture consent.88  Context, including the surroundings, the relationship
with the partner, or even the identity of the partner,89 does not seem
85. Id. at 528–29 (Kethledge, J., concurring.) (“[O]ur concern for a defendant’s constitu-
tional rights does not amount to a lack of concern for the interests served by the rape-shield
laws.”).
86. There is no reason to suppose the dissenters are consciously misogynistic or affirma-
tively mean-spirited. Aside, of course, from his remarks about having nothing left to protect,
which are misogynistic and frankly horrifying, even Judge Kethledge asserts that he approves of
rape shield. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 292 (Kethledge, J., concurring).
87. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 527 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
88. In fact, this is precisely what Gagne argued:
The idea that a woman would have sex with two or more men at the same time strikes
most people as bizarre and a jury, therefore, [would] be inclined to view a consent
defense in a case like this one with inherent disbelief. The evidence of past consensual
group sexual activity is relevant to show that the charged incident in question occurred
consensually, as [the defendant] testified it did, rather than as [P.C.] stated.”
Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 503.
89. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer discusses Gagne in her article, Judging Sex, where she
uses it to illustrate how courts “persist in making normative judgments about women’s sexual-
ity.” Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2012). She specifically
notes what should be, but apparently is not, obvious: “The identity of a woman’s sexual partner
greatly impacts her willingness to consent to sexual activities.” Id. at 1484.
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to affect the relevance of the propensity argument.  What matters only
is that the victim is the type of woman who would do such a thing.90
Taz’s scholarship is clearly essential reading about and for those
who share the dissenters’ mindset. Despite protestations to the con-
trary,91 the dissenters ultimately resist rape shield in theory and prac-
tice.92 Rape shield does not make sense to the dissenters because it
subverts their worldview of how women should and do behave. The
dissenters’ deep conviction that the propensity evidence of past sexual
behavior is “vital” and “indispensable,” explains why we have rape
shield in the first place.93
Judge Kethledge’s newly minted rape shield exception, “nothing
left to protect,” is truly shocking.94 Judge Kethledge does not see any
distinction between engaging in consensual sexual acts in private and
being questioned about them in a hostile and deriding manner in pub-
lic. Apparently after an alleged rape victim engages in certain sexual
behavior that Judge Kethledge finds distasteful or even just unusual,
the victim forfeits rape shield protection entirely. This focus on wo-
men’s propensities and prior sexual activity functions to control wo-
men’s behavior.  The social message is that sexual behavior too far
outside the norm exposes women to attack and humiliation. The law
will not come to the aid of a rape victim if in the past she has been
incautious, sexually adventurous, or deviant.95
90. Tuerkheimer notes that “female sexuality that fails to conform to normative standards
sits uneasily with rape shield law.” Id. at 1490 (footnote omitted).  Instead, “retrograde notions
of deviancy are substituting for rational deliberation on the question of consent.” Id. at 1461.
Tuerkheimer argues that Gagne “shows how the scope of rape shield protection is defined by
reference to unmentioned, imagined benchmarks of acceptable female sexuality.” Id. at 1482.
91. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 528 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur concern for a defendant’s
constitutional rights does not amount to a lack of concern for the interests served by the rape-
shield laws.”).
92. Chief Judge Batchelder, who wrote the en banc plurality opinion and dissented in the
original three-judge panel, aptly observed that the dissenters’ desired outcome “invalidates all
rape shield laws as violative of the Sixth Amendment.” Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 301 (Batchelder,
C.J., dissenting).
93. See generally Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2011) (“But evidence that
a sexual-assault complainant often consented to sex with other men is archetypally prejudicial
and not highly probative of consent in a particular case; precisely that concern underlies rape
shield statutes.”).
94. Judge Sutton wrote a brief concurrence in part to emphasize that “the State’s interests
in its rape shield laws remain strong even after a trial court admits some evidence of the victim’s
past sexual practices.” Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 518 (Sutton, J., concurring).
95. See TASLITZ, supra note 1.
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Finally the dissenters can be fairly criticized for minimizing the
state interest at stake in applying rape shield.96 When a piece of evi-
dence fits within the exception to rape shield, it nevertheless must be
otherwise admissible and pass a Rule 403 balancing test whereby the
evidence may be excluded if the unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighs its probative value.97 Even assuming that the relevance of the
two pieces of evidence in Gagne was high, there is still the problem of
unfair prejudice. The danger of such evidence is that the trier of fact
will believe that Clark has consented so often that she will (and did)
consent to anything.
Even more pernicious than overvaluing the relevance of prior
sexual behavior is the likelihood that the trier of fact might be less
inclined to care about the victim’s welfare or might believe that she
“had it coming to her.” This type of thinking taps into rape myths
about fallen, ruined women. If Clark consented to a three-way sexual
encounter, she crossed a line of propriety where rape shield no longer
serves to protect her. Finally, no one seemed to raise the issue of the
extreme prejudice of Clark’s alleged proposal of an incestuous three-
some among Gagne, his father, and herself. Even if a jury would for-
give adventurous sex, incest might cross a line that would lead a jury
to detest Clark and refuse to vindicate her rape.
The idea that some people cling to sexist assumptions, believe in
rape myths, and adopt worldviews that have the effect of circumscrib-
ing women’s acceptable sexual expression cannot be news. As Taz ex-
plained in Rape Trials and the Culture of the Courtroom, it would be
ridiculous to imagine that our society has outgrown its fondness for
patriarchal stories.98 It is therefore more interesting, and in some re-
spects depressing, to analyze the role of patriarchal stories in the plu-
rality and concurring opinions in Gagne. If we shift the focus to the
judges who voted to reverse the habeas grant, then we can spot the
residual power of rape myths and patriarchal stories that undergird
those opinions and influence the understanding of rape shield.
96. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 536 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (“the State’s interests in excluding
the evidence were minimal.”).
97. See United States. v. Mack, No: 1:13CR278, 2014 WL 356502, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31
2014); see also United States v. Anderson, 467 Fed. 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Although the
language of Rule 412(b)(1)(B) is unqualified, it is well accepted that the admissibility of prior
sexual acts between the accused and the alleged victim in order to prove consent is not
absolute.”).
98. See generally TASLITZ, supra note 1.
428 [VOL. 58:411
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HOW\58-2\HOW202.txt unknown Seq: 19 14-JUL-15 11:03
The Seductive Power of Patriarchal Stories
Chief Judge Batchelder, who wrote the dissenting opinion on the
original panel and the plurality for the en banc, displays some tenta-
tiveness and contradiction in her two opinions.  She seems to vacillate
between (1) arguing that the evidence is not relevant at all (or barely
so) and (2) conceding that it is indeed extremely relevant but never-
theless prejudicial, and that the determination of the Michigan court
should be respected, particularly because the state has an interest in
encouraging prosecution and avoiding victim trauma.
In Judge Batchelder’s original panel dissent, there is no equivoca-
tion. She wrote:
Some 35 years ago, the Michigan state legislature determined that a
criminal defendant accused of rape may not introduce evidence
about the victim’s past sexual behavior, because the victim’s past
willingness is not relevant to the question of present consent. The
majority here disagrees with that legislative determination and con-
cludes that evidence of the victim’s promiscuity or previous willing-
ness to engage in somewhat similar sex acts was not only relevant
but was “indispensable” and “the most relevant evidence.”99
In her en banc opinion, there is a thread of ambiguity and uncer-
tainty. In the en banc plurality opinion, Batchelder focuses primarily
on the habeas standard and the fact that the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals was not objectively unreasonable.
It might be that Gagne is correct that, as a matter of his defense,
this was the “most relevant evidence” and the state courts were
wrong to exclude it, but “whether the trial judge was right or wrong
is not the pertinent question under AEDPA.” The question is
whether the last state court’s decision was “objectively
unreasonable.”100
Part of Judge Batchelder’s ambivalence stems from trying to meet
the various arguments of the dissenters that the evidence was constitu-
tionally mandated. As noted above, the judges who dissented en banc
argued that the evidence of the other two alleged incidents were “the
most relevant evidence” and “indispensable,”101 so part of the re-
sponse by Judge Batchelder is clearly an argument in the alternative
even if the disputed evidence is credible and highly relevant,102 it is
99. Gagne I, 606 F.3d at 292–93 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
100. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 517.
101. Id. at 527 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
102. To be sure, jurors might find this behavior outlandish, aberrant, abnormal, bizarre,
disgusting, or even deviant and, therefore, find it incredible or inherently unbelievable
that P.C. would have consented to it. And it is not unreasonable to surmise that those
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still inadmissible. But nevertheless, her commitment to the notion that
the evidence was not relevant at all seemed to waiver.
Past consent to a sexually adventurous escapade with the accused
and another man simultaneously does not indicate that the woman
would consent to engage in similar sex acts with the same men on
another occasion (the evidence that was admitted by the Michigan
trial court) or with the accused and a different man (the contested
Bermudez evidence). Behavior that is consensual in one circumstance
could be forced in another. In his concurrence, Judge Clay wrote “sep-
arately to clarify the limitations required under the Michigan rape
shield law and to further respond to the dissent’s argument in favor of
admitting ‘pattern of conduct’ evidence.”103 He lucidly and forcefully
explained:
The only bridge to finding evidence of consensual sex between
Clark and Bermudez material to whether Clark had consensual sex
with Gagne on July 3, 2000, is to conclude that the kind of woman
who would say “yes” to someone is the kind of woman who always
says “yes.” But this is the kind of assumption that the Michigan leg-
islature attempted to circumvent by enacting its rape shield law, and
to rule otherwise would undermine the obvious intent of the
legislature.104
Judge Clay concluded that: “Such superfluous details of Clark’s sexual
activity with Bermudez would serve no purpose but to embarrass or
humiliate Clark; and furthermore, they fail the materiality test, and
should be excluded.”105 Similarly, in his concurrence, Judge Griffin
critically observed that “the dissent embraces the inference that be-
cause the victim did it before, she likely did it again.”106
In contrast, the dissenters’ argued that in some cases the accused
really needs to show the victim’s propensity because it (she?) is
weirder than the jury would otherwise dare to guess. Judges Clay and
jurors would be more likely to find consent if they were told that she had engaged in —
and offered to engage in — group sex at least two other times in the past.
Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 517.
103. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 524 (Clay, J., concurring in the judgment only).
104. Id. Judge Clay’s observations are mirrored by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which
explained that “the complainant’s willing participation in a threesome with Gagne and
Bermudez is not probative of whether she consented to a threesome with Gagne and Swathwood
on the night of the alleged offense.” People v. Swathwood, Nos. 235540 and 235541, 2003 WL
1880143, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2003) (finding the alleged events involving Bermudez
to be distinguishable and noting that other evidence that “the complainant was not averse to
group sexual activity” was admitted in the description of a prior, consensual three-way sexual
encounter among Gagne, Swathwood, and Clark).
105. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 524 (Clay, J., concurring in the judgment only).
106. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 520 (Griffin, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Griffin fully understood and rejected the dissenters’ argument, seeing
it for what it was: a camouflaged propensity rationale serving to nul-
lify rape shield’s policy and intellectual underpinnings.
Gagne v. Booker should have been an easy case, particularly be-
cause of the almost insurmountable standard on habeas. And yet, five
judges on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit could not resist
the draw of propensity evidence about the sexual conduct and procliv-
ities of the victim. Even some of the judges who voted to reverse the
grant of habeas did so with reluctance, finding the two pieces of ex-
cluded evidence important to fairness, despite the fact they their ad-
mission was not clearly commanded by Supreme Court precedent.
And Judge Batchelder waivered on the relevance of the excluded evi-
dence sufficiently enough to inspire Judges Clay and Griffin to write
separately.
V. RETHINKING THE APPLICATION OF THE RAPE
SHIELD EXCEPTION FOR PRIOR SEX
WITH THE ACCUSED
The Gagne case raises deep questions about the legitimate role of
propensity arguments in applying rape shield exceptions. In dissent,
Judge Kethledge emphasized that every rape shield statute “contains
an exception for evidence of consensual sex with the defendant.”107
The judges disagreed about whether this exception applied at all to
the facts of Gagne, and whether the rights protected therein are con-
stitutionally mandated. But it is worth examining why prior sex with
the accused is an exception in the first place. Although limiting the
evidence of prior sexual behavior to sex with the accused does under-
mine the broader retrograde notion that once a victim consents to one
man, she is in general a “consenter” to all, it is still problematic. The
exception can create mischief because it taps into the “intimacy dis-
count” by which crimes against intimates are less likely to be per-
ceived as criminal activities or will be punished more leniently.108
Judge Kethledge reads the exception for prior sex with the ac-
cused as merely a permitted version use of propensity evidence–the
victim agreed to sleep with this guy once, so it is more likely that she
agreed on another occasion. This is not a necessary or wise interpreta-
107. Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 529 (Kethledge, J., dissenting); see Anderson, supra note 18, at
118.
108. See Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equal-
ity in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 701–06 (2006).
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tion. He ignores the insight of Professor Tuerkheimer that “consent is
contingent—meaning that consent on one occasion is not probative of
consent on another.”109 The special exception for prior sex with the
accused relies on “the equally invidious common law inference that a
woman’s consent to sexual intercourse has no temporal con-
straints.”110 Reading the exception as admitting the victim’s propen-
sity to have sex with the accused subverts the policies of rape shield
and taps into the rape myth surrounding date-rape and rape in mar-
riage; that once a woman says yes to a particular man, she consents for
all time.
It is possible, however, to understand the exception for sex with
the accused in ways that give the exception meaning without under-
mining the practical benefits and polices of rape shield. There are at
least three legitimate ways to read the exception without resorting to a
propensity argument. First, the information about the prior relation-
ship can help establish the victim’s bias or motive. Although it may
also tap into a negative stereotype concerning the lying, vengeful wo-
man, evidence about motive is often highly relevant. The accused has
a right to say that he and the victim had a bad break up and that the
false accusation against him was made out of malice.111
Second, when the substantive rape law turns on the accused’s
subjective understanding of consent, the prior relationship between
the victim and the accused will sometimes be highly relevant. A word-
less sexual encounter between people who have a sexual history might
account for the accused’s belief that he received glances of encourage-
ment and assent during the encounter.
Finally, without information that the accused and the victim knew
each other, the jury will be confused about why certain events took
place.  For instance, in Gagne, the jury required some explanation of
why Gagne stopped by Clark’s house and why she was willing to have
sex with him, at least at first. So, information about a prior sexual
relationship may be necessary to explain context.112
109. Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 1494.
110. See Anderson, supra note 18, at 121.
111. In a similar manner, evidence about a sexual relationship with a third party else may be
relevant to show why the woman is lying about rape. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 230
(1988); FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C); Orenstein, supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also
Anderson, supra note 18 at 152–53.
112. See Anderson, supra note 18 at 130 (“For the sake of background and perspective, it is
appropriate to allow the defendant to discuss general information about the nature of the par-
ties’ relationship, such as the fact that the parties were married or lived together, or dated
previously.”).
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None of the above reasons is grounded on a propensity to have
sex with the accused. In fact, propensity evidence is not as relevant as
those who are swayed by patriarchal stories think. Such propensity
evidence certainly does not rise to a constitutional mandate for admis-
sion. All evidence of prior sex with the accused should be screened by
the trial judge for relevance and subject to Rule 403 balancing.
VI. THE PROBLEMATIC CONFLUENCE OF
RACE AND RAPE
The dissenters in Gagne argued that something peculiar and un-
expected about the victim’s sexual behavior and propensity consti-
tuted essential information for the jury. As Professor Deborah
Tuerkheimer has persuasively argued, this type of thinking represents
a constrained notion of female sexuality where “retrograde notion of
chastity powerfully influence judicial inquiry.”113  It is interesting to
speculate on what other circumstances besides the group-sex and the
victim’s  prior sex with the accused (both present in Gagne) might be
deemed highly relevant to counteract suppositions about “normal”
women, their sexual behavior, and the likelihood of consent.  One
problematic but very revealing scenario involves interracial sex.
In an older case, People v. Williams, the defendants challenged
New York’s rape shield law on statutory and constitutional grounds,
arguing that the trial judge should have admitted evidence that the
white teen-aged victim had previously engaged in group sex with dif-
ferent black men.114 On appeal, the accused presented a theory of rel-
evance very similar to that of the dissenters in Gagne, arguing “that
the prohibited evidence was needed to counter a possible inference by
the jury that no woman would voluntarily have sexual relations with
three men she had met just hours before on the street.”115 Although
unstated, the opinion very clearly implied that no young white woman
from the suburbs would voluntarily have sex with three black men she
met just hour before on the streets of New York. The court affirmed
the exclusion of the evidence in part because the prosecution did not
dwell on the unusual nature of the encounter in making his case.116
113. Tuerkheimer, supra note 89, at 1489.
114. People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. 1993).
115. Id. at 735. At trial, the accused were pretty muddled in their reasoning, arguing that
“evidence of the victim’s prior group sex with black males would show her motivation for testify-
ing against defendants.” Id.
116. Id.
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In another older case, People v. Hackett, the accused, a black
man, sought to introduce evidence that the victim, a white man, en-
gaged in previous homosexual acts with different black men, including
three days before the alleged rape.117 The accused claimed that the
evidence was necessary “to circumvent the inference that it would be
improbable that a white male prisoner would consent to sodomy by a
black male prisoner.”118 The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the
exclusion of the evidence, explaining that  “a close[ ] question is
presented where such evidence was sought to dispel the assumption
that most jurors would believe such an act, especially given the inter-
racial element, is not likely to occur voluntarily.”119 The Court never-
theless held that the accused was not denied his constitutional right to
confrontation in part because some other evidence of homosexual
conduct with a black prisoner was introduced.120
Both cases involved interracial sex and another potential taboo
(in Williams, group sex, in Hackett, gay sex).121 The confounding fac-
tor of race however, might alter the calculus. Certainly, if the prosecu-
tor were to argue that the victim would never consent to sex with a
black man, the probative value of such impeachment evidence in-
creases tremendously and may rise to a constitutional imperative. But
what do we do with the unspoken racist assumption that a white per-
son would not generally consent to sex with a black man?
Taz noted how the patriarchal stories about rape alter when the
accused is a black man and the victim is white (usually, but as Hackett
indicates, not always a woman).122 Our historic skepticism of victims
softens a bit when the perpetrator is a black man. As Taz wrote con-
cerning the troubling history of false rape accusations against black
men in American history: “A black defendant/white victim combina-
tion alone entitled a jury in some courts to draw the inference beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended rape.”123 He traced
117. People v. Hackett, 265 N.W.2d 120, 126–27 (Mich. 1984).
118. See generally Mark A. Whately & Ronald E. Riggio, Gender Difference in Attributions
of Blame for Male Rape Victims, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 502 (1993) (analyzing victim
blaming based on gender).
119. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d at 127.
120. Id.
121. In a psychological experiment more responsibility, more pleasure and less trauma was
attributed to male rape victims who were homosexual than those who were heterosexual. See
Damon Mitchell et al., Attributions of Victim Responsibility, Pleasure and Trauma in Male Rape,
36 J. SEX RESEARCH 369, 369 (1999).
122. Male victims of rape also suffer from rape myths, particular from the myth that if the
victim did not actively and physically fight back, then the victim desired the unconsented-to sex.
123. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 29.
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the history of racism in rape charges from the Scottsboro boys to the
central park jogger case.124 Taz noted: “The usual presumption is that
a suspect is not a bully but, rather, a victim of a Lying Woman. But this
presumption is turned on its head when there is a black defendant and
a white victim.”125As Professor I. Bennett Capers recently observed,
in addition to suspicion of victims, “there is another history of distrust
that is equally important: the distrust of testimony by black men.”126
Unlike the propensities of victims that are perceived as unusual
(group sex, anal sex, and sadomasochism), which often serve to shame
the victim, the issue of race seems more legitimate. It is not simply
something about the victim, but it is inextricably intertwined with the
identity of the accused. It is troubling to rely on the propensity of the
victim to have sex with black men; it is equally disturbing to let the
jury’s racist attitudes serve to make consent less likely than it would
have been had the perpetrator been white. Information that the victim
had sex with black men in the past may be held against her; but silence
on that point may tap into historic racist notions that infect the basic
fairness of the trial.
VII. SEARCHING FOR THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE
RIGHTS OF THE RAPE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED
The constitutional exception to rape shield reflects tensions in ev-
idence law between protecting victims and assuring a fair defense, two
sometimes competing values, both cherished by our late colleague,
Taz. It also highlights difficult related questions about our continuing
reliance on propensity evidence, challenges notions of acceptable sex-
uality, and reminds us that our history and attitudes towards rape are
linked to issues of race.
Certainly, occasions exist when evidence that discloses a victim’s
sexual propensities and history must, out of basic fairness, be admissi-
ble.127 Issues of motive or evidence that directly contradicts the vic-
tim’s assertions may indeed be vital to the defense.  For instance, in
Lewis v. Wilkinson, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit appro-
124. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 30.
125. TASLITZ, supra note 1, at 31.
126. See I. Bennett Capers, The Unintentional Rapist, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1345, 1377
(2010).
127. As Judge Moore wrote, “[w]hen a state court mechanistically applies a rape shield stat-
ute to exclude indispensable evidence of a victim’s sexual history, habeas relief may be war-
ranted. That situation, however, is not before us today.” Gagne II, 680 F.3d at 523. (Moore, J.,
concurring in the judgment only).
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priately held that the trial court had unconstitutionally excluded en-
tries from the victim’s diary. 128 Even though the entries referred to
the victim’s past sexual conduct and proclivities, her statements were
essential because they cast doubt on her motives and indeed raised
questions as to whether a rape had occurred at all.129
However, there is no constitutional right to allow the victim’s
proclivity and sexual history to be introduced as propensity. The mis-
take many judges continue to make concerns the belief that propen-
sity in itself is “highly relevant” and “indispensable” to the defense.
The attempt to wedge sexual propensity into neutral pattern evidence
should always be rejected. It is barely relevant and always extremely
unfairly prejudicial to admit evidence that the victim tends to consent
to a particular form of sexual activity, or even that the victim tends to
consent to a particular person. Even an exception as deeply en-
trenched as the one for prior sex with the accused must be applied
carefully, so that it does not become a free pass for the accused be-
cause of the victim’s propensity to have sex with the accused.
Of all the tough problems Taz examined, the confluence of rape
myths and negative stereotypes about black men were the most intel-
lectually difficult and personally painful for our beloved lost col-
league, whose intellect and heart merged to produce great scholarship.
We are indebted to him for raising such questions in his scholarship
and for his personal example of how to wrestle with competing con-
cerns with integrity and compassion.
128. Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2002) (granting habeas for exclusion
of victim’s diary).
129. Id. at 417–18. The victim wrote: “I think I pounced on [the accused] because he was the
last straw. That, and because I’ve always seemed to need some drama in my life . . . I’m sick of
myself for giving in to them . . . I’m just not strong enough to say no to them. I’m tired of being a
whore. This is where it ends.” Id. at 417. The court observed that the victim’s statements could
“reasonably be said to form a particularized attack on the witnesses credibility directed toward
revealing possible ulterior motives, as well as implying her consent.” Id. at 422. The Court be-
lieved that the diary entries could be read as indicating that pursuing rape charges was the vic-
tim’s “way of taking a stand against all the men who previously took advantage of her” and that
no rape had occurred but rather the victim was angry at the accused’s sexually caddish behavior
as a “player.” Id. at 421.
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